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Abstract: As a promising next-generation computing paradigm, Mobile Cloud Computing 
(MCC) enables the large-scale collection and big data processing of personal private data. An 
important but often overlooked V of big data is data veracity, which ensures that the data used 
are trusted, authentic, accurate and protected from unauthorized access and modification. In 
order to realize the veracity of data in MCC, specific trust models and approaches must be 
developed. In this paper, a Category-based Context-aware and Recommendation 
incentive-based reputation Mechanism (CCRM) is proposed to defend against internal attacks 
and enhance data veracity in MCC. In the CCRM, innovative methods, including a data 
category and context sensing technology, a security relevance evaluation model, and a 
Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG)-based recommendation incentive scheme, are integrated into 
the process of reputation evaluation. Cost analysis indicates that the CCRM has a linear 
communication and computation complexity. Simulation results demonstrate the superior 
performance of the CCRM compared to existing reputation mechanisms under internal 
collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks. 
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1. Introduction  
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) combines cloud computing and mobile computing to 
provide mobile users with data storage and processing services in clouds, such as Amazon, 
Google AppEngine and Microsoft Azure, that perform resource-intensive computing [31, 32]. 
MCC is a highly promising technology trend for the future of mobile computing, and for this 
reason, there has been a phenomenal burst of research activities in MCC. Although MCC has 
attracted significant research and development efforts, there are salient open issues and 
challenges in the area of security and trust in MCC, which is an essential factor for the 
success of the burgeoning MCC paradigm [1, 26, 27, 31, 32].  
MCC enables the large-scale collection and processing of personal private data such as 
individuals’ locations and electronic medical records [5, 6, 26, 32]. The processing of this 
information using big data analytics has become a hot topic in MCC. In order to avoid making 
decisions based on the analysis of uncertain and imprecise data, it is crucial to maintain a high 
level of data veracity, which is often overlooked. But it is just as important as the other three 
V's of Big Data: Volume, Velocity and Variety. Data veracity includes two aspects: data 
certainty defined by their statistical reliability; and data trustworthiness defined by a number 
of factors including data origin, collection and processing methods, such as trusted 
infrastructure and facility [29]. Thus, apart from data confidentiality and privacy, data 
provenance must be certified and data must be accurate, complete and up-do-date as well [3, 
25]. Since ubiquitous access to the Internet in MCC exposes critical data and privacy 
information to new security threats, a number of research works have been focused on 
security and trust to cope with these new threats and enhance the data veracity in MCC.  
Data veracity shows how much the data used are trusted, authentic and protected from 
unauthorized access and modification. There are many security challenges in data veracity 
such as external denial-of-service, credential stealing, remote code injection, data integrity 
attacks, internal attacks, and supply chain attacks [10]. Consequently, the availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity of both the original data and the data analytics results are 
threatened by these attacks, e.g., the degraded availability of a big data system, the 
compromised confidentiality of the data and analytics, and the violated integrity of the data 
and analytic results. 
As an effort to tackle the aforementioned challenges, this paper focuses on the aspect of 
data trustworthiness to enhance data veracity through designing a reputation mechanism to 
defend against internal attacks in MCC. A new Category-based Context aware and 
Recommendation incentive reputation Mechanism (CCRM) is proposed, which incorporates 
innovative approaches in terms of data categories, context sensing, security relevance and 
recommendation incentive. To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of the first to 
describe this front of data veracity in MCC. The major contributions of this work include the 
following: 
(1) This paper proposes a new Category-based Context aware Reputation Mechanism 
(CCRM) to defend against the internal threats for enhancing data veracity in MCC. 
(2) The CCRM incorporates three key innovations: a Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG)-based 
distributed cheat-proof recommendation incentive scheme, a security level-based data 
category method, and a user context sensing technology. 
(3) Extensive OPNET simulation experiments demonstrate that the CCRM improves the 
performance of the reputation mechanism compared to the state-of-the-art including the 
RP-CRM [14], ARTSense [23] and Harmony [22] mechanisms. The CCRM can 
effectively defend against internal collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks to 
enhance data veracity in MCC. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of 
related work, Section 3 describes network and adversary models, Section 4 introduces the 
implementation details of the CCRM, Section 5 analyzes the cost and evaluate the 
performance of the CCRM. Finally, Section 6 presents the paper’s conclusions .  
 
2. Related Work  
Data veracity is becoming a research hotspot of big data and there have been many related 
studies in the literature [2, 4, 10, 16, 20, 15]. For example, Kepner et al. [10] introduced a new 
technique called Computing on Masked Data (CMD) to improve data veracity while allowing 
a wide range of computations and queries to be performed with low overhead by combining 
efficient cryptographic encryption methods with an associative array representation of big 
data. Bodnar et al. [4] proposed a veracity assessment model for information dissemination on 
social media networks that combines natural language processing and machine learning 
algorithms to mine textual content generated by each user. Sanger et al. [20] introduced two 
veracity research branches emerging from the combination of the terms of interest, namely 
Big Data for Trust and Trust in Big Data. Aman et al. [2] proposed a two-stage solution for 
building an electricity consumption prediction model to address the problem of data veracity 
raised in the context of Smart Electricity Grids. Lukoianova and Rubin [16] focus on veracity 
as a critical quality factor and introduce a big data veracity index that combines the three 
dimensions of subjectivity, deception and implausibility.  
Data veracity includes two aspects: data certainty and data trustworthiness. This paper 
focuses on the aspect of data trustworthiness to enhance data veracity using a reputation 
mechanism to defend against internal attacks in MCC. Tremendous research efforts have been 
focused on the reputation mechanism as a key scheme for managing trust to improve data 
security and privacy. Since this paper investigates the data veracity issue in MCC, in the 
following, we mainly review the existing research results regarding reputation mechanisms in 
MCC. 
Kim et al. [12] proposed a trust management mechanism for reliable data integration, 
management and applications in MCC. The mechanism suggested a method to quantify a 
one-dimensional trusting relationship based on the analysis of telephone call data from mobile 
devices. Liu et al. [15] presented a reputation mechanism to recognize selfish nodes much 
earlier and reduce the convergence time for isolating selfish nodes by combining familiarity 
values with subjective opinions. Hammam et al. [8] proposed a trust management system 
(TMC) for mobile ad-hoc clouds to verify that participants are reliable, available, and 
harmless. The TMC considered availability, neighbors’ evaluation and response quality, and 
task completeness; it also calculated the reputation trust value for nodes. Shen et al. [22] 
developed an integrated reputation management platform, Harmony, for collaborative cloud 
computing. Harmony incorporates an integrated reputation management component, a 
multi-QoS-oriented resource selection component and a price-assisted resource control 
component to enhance their mutual interactions for efficient and trustworthy resource sharing 
among clouds. Zhang et al. [30] presented a general framework to jointly design incentive 
mechanisms and reputation schemes in social cloud systems. The proposed framework 
combined a repeated game framework-based incentive mechanism with a differential 
reputation-based reward/punishment scheme to incentivize users to contribute their resources. 
In the existing research on data veracity, many studies were based on the assumption that 
the participants are trustworthy, thus ignoring the internal security threats launched by an 
inside attacker that has a legal identity and gives dishonest recommendations to frame up 
good parties and/or boost trust values of malicious peers. Meanwhile, most existing 
reputation-based trust models in MCC were based on the traditional cryptographic encryption 
and authentication techniques without considering internal security threats. Consequently, it is 
an open problem and a challenging task to design a reputation mechanism to prevent internal 
attacks in order to enhance the data veracity in MCC.  
 
3. Network and Adversary Model 
A. Network Model 
In this paper, we focus on the network environment of MCC, which is considered to be a 
viable solution to implement fast, large-scale big data applications [11, 34]. A typical MCC 
architecture, which consists of a mobile client network, a wireless mesh backbone network 
and a cloud service platform, is depicted in Fig. 1. The mobile client is connected to the base 
transceiver station (BTS) and accesses the mesh backbone via the mesh router; these are 
linked to each other and communicate with the cloud through the Internet. The cloud service 
platform includes cloud servers to offer data-rich services such as queries of electronic 
medical records. 
 
Fig. 1. An Architecture of MCC  
 
B.  Adversary Model 
This paper focuses on the internal security threats [13, 14] in MCC that can affect data 
veracity. The internal threats are launched by an inside attacker who is a legal and certified 
user. The internal attacks may compromise certain users and gain full control of them. Once 
users are compromised, the attacker can gain access to all stored information, including public 
keys and private keys [28]. The attacker could also reprogram the captured users to behave in 
a malicious manner [27]. Therefore, the traditional encryption and authentication techniques 
may no longer be effective [33]. The specific internal attacks considered in this paper are as 
follows: 
  Collusion attacks: attackers can collude and provide either high or low 
recommendations to each other. 
  Bad mouthing attacks: attackers provide dishonest recommendations to frame up good 
parties and/or boost reputation values of malicious peers. 
4. Category-Based Context-Aware Reputation Mechanism (CCRM) 
In this section, we elaborate on the proposed Category-based Context-aware Reputation 
Mechanism (CCRM), which integrates the reputation evaluation with data category [17, 23], 
context-awareness technologies [19] and the VCG mechanism [7, 18, 24] to defend against 
the insider threat and enhance the data veracity in MCC. The CCRM is implemented in both 
mobile clients and cloud service providers to perform bidirectional reputation evaluation. The 
CCRM includes three phases: direct reputation computation, recommended reputation 
computation and final reputation computation. 
In CCRM, data are classified into different categories based on the sensitivity level of data. 
The higher is the sensitivity level of data in a category, the higher is the user reputation 
required for a user to access the data category. The details of the reputation computation are 
described as follows. The main notations and symbols used in this paper are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Main notations and symbols 
Direct
y:xR ,
Rec
:y xR ,
Final
y:xR  The x’s direct, recommended and final reputation towards y  
C, c The set of the data categories and a specific data category 
c
sAC ,
c
fAC  
The number of successful and unsuccessful accesses to the data 
category c  
dir
unp 	   The uncertainty about the history interaction 
timeα , locationα , cα  
The weight factors that determine how much the time, location and 
data category of the interactions affect Directy:xR  
Elocation, Etime The error of location sensing and time sensing 
locationβ , timeβ  The location sensitivity and time sensitivity parameters 
jN , slotN  
The number of times that x’s historical data access category is 
confirmed as category j, the number of time slots 
Q,q, γ  The transfer efficiency, bandwidth requirement, signal-to-noise ratio 
of the receiver 
( )iV q , ( )iP q  
The profit function that gives the profits gained by user i when it 
provides the recommendation, the cost of user i 
pcost The cost of the bandwidth usage 
o , ,i jb  
The set of bandwidth allocation, the allocation that bandwidth i is 
assigned to the user j 
*π , o* The system’s best profit, the best allocation result 
( , )i iT q o  The taxes for a user i 
*( , )j j i
j i
u q o
≠
∑ , ( , )j j i
j i
u q o−
≠
∑  The total utility of all the other users when i participates and 
withdraws 
( )i,yθ ， ( , )
sl
i xθ  
The security level relevance factor between y and the 
recommendation user i，the security level relevance factor between i 
and the recommended user x 
1η , 2η 	  
The weight factors used to determine how much the direct 
reputation and integrated recommended reputation affect the final 
reputation  
rf , f θ  The reputation and the security relevance fade factors 
itm , ntm  
The number of the objects within the recommendation users set at 
times ti and tn 
 
4.1. Direct Reputation Computation 
The direct reputation computation is run at each user that stores its historical opinion 
towards the others in the relevant local database. When a user wants to request (or provide) a 
service from (or to) another user (including unknown users), it will send a request message to 
all neighboring users. Each neighboring user receiving the request will first execute the direct 
reputation computation function to evaluate the requestor’s direct reputation and judge 
whether it is a malicious user.  
Suppose x and y are the client and service provider, respectively. The direct reputation of x 
toward y, Directy:xR , can be computed as: 
Direct
C
1 [(1 ) ( )]
| C |
c
dir s
cy:x un
fc
ACR p AC∈
= ∗ − ∗∑                          (1) 
where C is the set of the data categories and c stands for a specific data category. csAC  and 
c
fAC  denote the number of successful or unsuccessful access attempts to the data category c, 
respectively. dirunp  denotes the uncertainty about the historical interaction, which is given by: 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )dirun time location cp α α α= − ∗ − ∗ −                           (2) 
where timeα , locationα  and cα  are the weight factors that determine how much the time, 
location and accessed data category of the interaction affect Directy:xR , respectively. 
In CCRM, a user’s location will influence its reputation among the other users, so if a 
user’s location is far away from the expected location then it is not as trustworthy as a user on 
a nearby location. We denote the expected location and the actual location as L and L’, 
respectively. We define |L-L’| as the distance between them and Elocation as the error of 
location sensing. We then formally define the location factor locationα  as: 
| |(1 )location location locationE L Llocation e e
β βα ʹ′− ∗ − − ∗= ∗ −                     (3) 
where locationβ  is the parameter that controls the weight of the location factor’s influence on 
reputation. 
Time is another critical factor as the historical interaction usually has a great reference 
value. Similarly to the location factor, we denote T’ as the time instant of last interaction 
between the provider and the requestor and T as the time instant of current interaction 
between the provider and the requestor. We define Etime  as the error of time sensing. Next, 
the time factor timeα  can be computed as 
 | |(1 )time time timeE T Ttime e e
β βα ʹ′− ∗ − − ∗= ∗ −                          (4) 
where timeβ  is the parameter that controls the weight of the time factor’s influence on the 
reputation.  
  In CCRM, similar to the location and time factors, the historical records of accessed data 
category will also influence the direct reputation computation. High and low category data are 
the data category with high data sensitivity and low data sensitivity, respectively. For a user 
used to access the low category data, its sudden access to a higher category data is noteworthy. 
Therefore, we define and compute the accessed data category factor cα as:   
                       
|C|
|C|
1
( )
, ( 1 )
c i
j
slotj Th
i
j
j
E
N i N
N
α µ
µ =
=
=⎧
⎪
⎪⎪
=⎨
=⎪
⎪
⎪⎩
∑
∑
                       (5) 
where iµ  is the rate between the number of accesses to the data categories higher than the 
threshold Th and the total number of accesses to all categories. jN  represents the number of 
times that x’s historical accessed data category is confirmed as category j, and slotN  denotes 
the number of the time slots. 
 The details of the unidirectional direct reputation computation are shown in Algorithm 1. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Algorithm 1: Direct Reputation Computation 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Input: Requester x’s information 
Output: Whether x is a malicious node or not 
1. Begin 
2. Requester x sends a Request message; 
3. x’s neighbor nodes such as y receives the Request message; 
4. If ( ) ( )’' ’'down downlocation timeLx s TH T Tx s THL >− ∧ >−  then 
5.   y executes the Direct Reputation Computation and returns the result as: 
6.   RDirect=Direct_reputation (x); 
7. Else  
8.   y drops the Request message; 
9. End if 
10. If ( )Direct upperdirectR TH>  then 
11.  Final DirectR R= ; 
12. Else if ( )down Direct upperdirect directTH R TH< <  then 
13.   y executes the Recommendation Reputation Query Function; 
14.   y executes the Recommendation Reputation Computation; 
15.   y executes the Final Reputation Computation and gets the FinalR ； 
16.   Else  
17.      1FinalR = − ; 
18. End if 
19. If ( )Final downfinalR TH<  then 
20.   x is considered as a malicious node and will be isolated; 
21. Else if ( )down Final upperfinal finalTH R TH< <  then 
22.   x will be punished by decreasing its reputation value; 
23.   Else  
24.     x is considered as a trustworthy node; 
25.     y sends Accept message to x; 
26. End if  
27. End 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
In order to gain the service, requester x sends a request message to all neighboring users. Each 
neighboring user receiving the request first executes the direct reputation computation 
function to evaluate the requestor’s direct reputation and judge whether it is a malicious user. 
Suppose y is one of the service providers and it receives the Request message. If both the 
distance between x’s actual location and expected location and the gap between the historical 
interaction time instant and current time instant are greater than the thresholds downlocationTH  
and downtimeTH , y computes the direct reputation; otherwise y drops the Request message. If the 
direct reputation is greater than the threshold upperdirectTH , we set the final reputation equal to the 
direct reputation. If the result of the direct reputation is between the thresholds downdirectTH  and 
upper
directTH , then y executes the recommendation reputation query and computation and 
computes the final reputation. If the result of the direct reputation is less than the downdirectTH , 
we set the final reputation equal to -1. When y finds the final reputation, if it is less than the 
down
finalTH , then x is considered as a malicious node and will be isolated. If the final reputation 
is between the thresholds downfinalTH  and 
upper
finalTH , x will be punished by decreasing its 
reputation value. If the final reputation is greater than the upperfinalTH , x is considered as a 
trustworthy node and y will send an Accept message to x. 
4. 2. Recommended Reputation Computation 
If the direct reputation computation in section 4.1 cannot lead to a decision, y will first 
execute the recommended reputation query using Algorithm 2 to query x’s reputation from its 
neighbors. Afterwards, y will compute the integrated recommended reputation combining the 
received replies of recommended reputations to the query, which will be described in the 
subsection 4.2.2. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Algorithm 2: Recommended Reputation Query 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Input: Users x and y’s information 
Output: x’s reputation 
1. Begin 
2. y sends a Query message to neighbors; 
3. Wait (3-5 seconds); 
4. y’s neighbor user such as k receives the Query message; 
5. If ( )' downsly security level TH> then 
6.  k retrieves its direct reputation opinion about x on local reputation database 
7.  and returns it as: 
8. Direct _ ( , )xR Reputation query x Final ReputationDatabase= ;    
9. k sends Reply (y, DirectxR ); 
10. Else  
11.  k drops the Query message; 
12. End if  
13. End 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Traditional reputation mechanisms improve the trustworthiness of recommendations 
through weighted summation of recommendations from different recommenders. In an open 
network environment such as MCC, however, these mechanisms must face the significant 
problems caused by selfish and malicious users who refuse to render recommendations in 
order to avoid consuming limited resources or provide dishonest recommendations to launch 
collusion or bad mouthing attacks. 
To overcome the above shortcomings, in this subsection, we first propose a VCG based 
Distributed Cheat-proof Recommendation incentive scheme (VDCR). Next, the VDCR is 
incorporated into the recommended reputation computation process to motivate users to 
provide honest recommendations.  
4.2.1. VDCR Scheme 
The VCG mechanism is a dominant strategy mechanism, which belongs to a category of 
mechanism design. The VCG mechanism can achieve ex-post incentive compatibility 
(truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every player in the game) [7, 18, 24]. The VCG 
mechanism has the following attributes: 
  The mechanism is incentive compatible. 
  The mechanism is individual rational. 
Since users must consume bandwidth resources to provide the recommendation information, 
the recommendation processes can be naturally modelled as a VCG-based bandwidth auctions 
process with the user’s profit model and system’s profit model defined as below.  
1) Profit Model of User 
Suppose user i wants to provide a recommendation and its bandwidth requirement is q, 
which is often private information known only to the user. Using the classical transmission 
model [9], q can be given by:  
2log (1 ),
1.5
ln(0.2 / )tar
q Q
Q
BER
γ= + ⋅⎧
⎪
⎨ =⎪
⎩
                               (6) 
where Q is the transfer efficiency and γ  is the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiver.  
The profit of the user i, ( )i iu q , can be expressed as: 
( ) - ( ),
( )
0, '
i i
i i
V q P q purchase
u q
don t purchase
⎧
= ⎨
⎩
                (7) 
where ( )iV q is the profit function that gives the profits gained by user i when it provides the 
recommendation. ( )iV q  is given by:  
2' ''
( )
. .
0, (0) 0
( ) 0, ( ) 0
i i i
i
i i
V q aq bq
s t
q V
V q V q
= +
= =
> <
                           (8) 
in which a, b are the weight factors. ( )iP q  is the cost of user i and can be computed as: 
cos( )i t iP q p q=                                   (9) 
where pcost denotes the cost of the bandwidth usage, which is relevant to the reputation. The 
higher the reputation, the lower the cost. 
  Hence, when qi > 0, the profit of the user i, ( )i iu q , is given by: 
2
cos( ) ( )i i i t iu q aq b p q= + −                             (10) 
2) Profit Model of System 
We consider the MCC environment consisting of n users. Let 
,( | 1,2, , ; 1,2, , )i jo b i m j n= =   =  denote the set of bandwidth allocation, where ,i jb  
indicates that bandwidth i is assigned to the user j. Next, the system’s best profit *π can be 
expressed as: 
* *
1 1
( , ) max ( , )
k
n n
i i i i ko Oi i
u q o u q oπ
∈
= =
= =∑ ∑                   (11) 
where o* is the best allocation result and is given by: 
*
1
argmax ( , )
k
n
i i ko O i
o u q o
∈
=
= ∑                            (12) 
3) VDCR 
Based on the above analysis, we can describe the details of the proposed VCG-based 
distributed cheat-proof recommendation incentive scheme (VDCR). 
In the VDCR, user must pay taxes ( , ) 0T q o >  in addition to the cost of bandwidth. The 
taxes for a user i are denoted as ( , )i iT q o , which is given by 
* *( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i j j i j j
j i j i
T q o u q o u q o−
≠ ≠
= −∑ ∑                 (13) 
 where *( , )j j i
j i
u q o
≠
∑  is the total utility of all other users when i participates. As opposed to 
*( , )j j i
j i
u q o
≠
∑ , ( , )j j i
j i
u q o−
≠
∑  is the total utility of all other users when i withdraws. 
Therefore, the best utility of user i can be expressed as: 
* * * *( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )]i i i i j j i j j
j i j i
u q o u q o u q o u q o−
≠ ≠
= − −∑ ∑         (14) 
Next, we prove that the proposed VDCR is a VCG mechanism. 
Theorem 1. The mechanism is incentive compatible. 
Proof: suppose user i needs iq  units of bandwidth to provide recommendation, but the 
user applies for ˆiq  units and declares that ˆ( ) ( )i i i iu q u q> , which returns the outcome of oˆ . 
According to the above description, user i must pay the taxes as:  
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i j j i j j
j i j i
T q o u q o u q o−
≠ ≠
= −∑ ∑  
Hence, the final utility of user i becomes: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )]
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
ˆ( ) ( , )
i i i i j j i j j
j i j i
i i j j j j i
j i j i
j j i
j i
u q o u q o u q o u q o
u q o u q o u q o
o u q oπ
−
≠ ≠
−
≠ ≠
−
≠
= − −
             = + −
             = −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
 
For *ˆ( )oπ π≤ , we obtain * *ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )i i i iu q o u q o≤ , which leaves user i with no motivation to 
provide false information; therefore, truth-telling is the best strategy.  
Theorem 2. The mechanism is individual rational.  
Proof: In an individual rational (IR) mechanism, rational users are expected to gain a 
higher utility from actively participating in the mechanism than from avoiding it. In the 
VDCR, we consider the following two malicious behaviors: 
(1) The user does not have the relative recommendation information, but it still applies for 
bandwidth to provide the recommendation. 
(2) The user does not have enough to pay the costs and taxes, but it still applies for 
bandwidth to provide the recommendation. 
The utility of the user with these malicious behaviors, ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )i iu q o , can be given by: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu q o u q o T q o= −       
It is straightforward to see that in both cases ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) 0i iu q o < , when the incentive compatibility 
is achieved. Therefore, for user i, utility > 0 and participation in the recommendation is an 
optimal choice, which means that the mechanism is individual rational. 
In sum, according to the definition of VCG, the proposed VDCR is a VCG mechanism. 
4.2.2. Computation of Integrated Recommended Reputation  
Let sl stand for security level, which means the security level of the data category that a 
user can access with its reputation. Suppose y receives n (n>1) recommended reputations, 
then the integrated recommended reputation, Rec:y xR , can be computed as follows: 
(1) Consider there are only two recommenders, k and k’, and their recommended opinions 
are in conflict. We say that k is more trustworthy than k’ and Rec Direct: :y x k xR R= , if any of the 
following conditions hold:  
( , ) ( ', )
Direct Direct
( , ) ( ', ) :
k y k y
k y k y y:k y kR R
θ θ
θ θ ʹ′
>⎧⎪
⎨
= ∧ >⎪⎩
                           (15) 
(2) Consider that if there are more than two recommenders, then the Rec:y xR  can be given by:  
( )Rec Direct: ( , ) :
1
1 *
n
y x j y j x
j
R R
n
θ
=
= ∗∑                           (16) 
In Eqs. (15) and (16), ( )i,yθ denotes the security relevance factor between service provider y 
and the recommendation user i, which characterizes the difference between the security level 
of y and that of i. Suppose user i recommends x to y, we define ( , )
sl
i xθ  as the security 
relevance factor between the users i and x. ( )i,yθ can be calculated as: 
1 2
( , )
1 2
( ) ( , )
1 2 1 2
, lg( )( )
, lg( )
1, , [0,1]
sly
i y sl sl i x
y i
sl
i,y i y sl i y sl i x
sl sl sl sl
slsl sl sl sl
sl sl sl sl
β β θ
θ β β θ
β β β β
⎧ < ∗ + ∗⎪ −
⎪⎪
= ≥ ∗ − + ∗⎨
⎪
+ = ∈⎪
⎪⎩
               (17) 
where 1slβ  and 
2
slβ  are the weight factors associated with the numerical difference between 
security levels of y and i and the security relevance factor ( , )
sl
i xθ , respectively. ( , )
sl
i xθ can be 
given by: 
: :
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where :y iR and :y xR are the reputation values of i and x, respectively. 
Algorithm 3 gives the details of the computation of integrated recommended reputation. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Algorithm 3: Computation of Integrated Recommended Reputation  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Input: N recommendation information 
Output: Integrated recommended reputation value 
1. Begin 
2. y receives n-1 Reply messages with the recommended reputation about x 
3.   and the information of the recommenders; 
4. y executes the recommenders’ selection process; 
5. for i=1 to n-1 
6. { If ( )' securityleveli s TH>  then 
7.   Put i into the recommender set R; 
8.   y executes the security relevance factor ( )i,yθ and ( , )
sl
i xθ  computation; 
9.  Else  
10.   y drops the Reply message; 
11.  End if } 
12. y executes the recommenders’ selection process again; 
13. for j=1 to |R|  
14. { If ( )(j:y) THθ ʹ′>  then 
15.  Put j into the recommender set R’; 
16.  End if } 
17. y executes the recommended reputation computation with R’ 
18.    and returns the result as: 
19. RRec=Rec_reputation (x); 
20. End 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
When y receives n-1 Reply messages, it first builds a recommender set R by comparing 
each recommender’s security level (sl) with a threshold, one by one. If a recommender’s sl is 
greater than the threshold, y will put it into set R, and then compute the corresponding 
relevance factor θ  and slθ . Then, y builds a more reliable recommender set R’ by selecting 
the recommender from R and comparing its security relevance factor θ  with the threshold. 
If a recommender’s θ  is greater than the threshold, y will put it into the new recommender 
set R’. Finally, y computes the recommended reputation with R’ and returns the result. 
4.3. Final Reputation Computation 
After finding the direct and recommended reputation, the final reputation Finaly:xR  can be 
computed as: 
Final Direct Rec
1 2 :
1 2 1 21, , [0,1]
y:x y:x y xR R Rη η
η η η η
⎧ = ∗ + ∗⎪
⎨
+ = ∈⎪⎩
                        (19) 
where 1η , 2η  are the weight factors for the direct reputation and integrated recommended 
reputation, respectively. 
4.4. Update of Reputation 
Because users’ reputations change over time, the direct reputation used at present cannot 
directly make use of the data stored in the local reputation database without considering the 
influence of time on the reputation. Denote itm and ntm  as the numbers of the objects within 
the recommendation users set at time ti and tn, respectively. Let rf  and f θ  represent the 
reputation and the security relevance fade factors, respectively. Next, the direct reputation at 
time tn can be updated as below: 
Direct r Final
n it t
R f f Rθ= ∗ ∗                               (20) 
Final 1 2(( ) * )r
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5. Cost Analysis and Performance Evaluation 
In the section, we first elaborate on the communication cost and the computation 
complexity, and then present the performance evaluation of the proposed reputation 
mechanism CCRM. 
5.1. Computation and Communication Cost 
The communication cost of CCRM can be calculated as follows: 
communication
request query reply ,
( 1) ( 1) ( 1),
(3 3).
Cost cost cost cost
O n O n O n
O n
= + +
= − + − + −
= −
                     (23) 
where requestcost , querycost and replycost  represent the number of the request, query, and reply 
messages transferred in the communication, respectively. n denotes the total number of users.  
The computation complexity can be analyzed as below: 
computation
direct vdcr rec final update
direct vdcr rec update
,
( ) ( ) ( ) (1) ( ),
(4 ).
Cost cost cost cost cost cost
O n O n O n O O n
O n
= + + + +
= + + + +
=
      (24) 
where directn , recn  and updaten represent the number of users involved in computing the direct 
reputation, recommended reputation and updated reputation, respectively, and vdcrn  is the 
number of users involved in running the VDCR mechanism. 
The above analysis indicates that both the communication cost and the computation 
complexity of the CCRM is O(n). Therefore, with the strong computing power of modern 
mobile devices and the good capacity of contemporary communication networks, the 
influences of the computation and communication cost are little and thus negligible 
considering the great benefits of enhanced security and data veracity the proposed mechanism 
brings to MCC. 
5.2. Performance Evaluation 
The OPNET [21] simulation experiments were conducted to evaluate the performance of 
the CCRM in MCC. The simulation scenario includes a mobile client network, a wireless 
mesh backbone network and a cloud service platform, as shown in Fig. 1. The mobile client 
network consists of 100 mobile clients. The mesh backbone network has 10 mesh routers and 
there are 10 service providers in the cloud. The physical layer uses a fixed range transmission 
model where two nodes can directly communicate with each other only if they are within a 
certain range, i.e., within a hop. The arrival traffic at each mobile client follows a Constant Bit 
Rate (CBR) of 1 Mbps and a packet size of 1024 bytes. The channel data rate is 10 Mbps. The 
Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) [13] is used as the routing protocol. The security 
parameters 1slβ ,
2
slβ , 1η , 2η , a, b are 0.5, 0.5, 0.4, 0.6, -10, 40, which are empirical values 
obtained from multiple experiments. Of which, 1slβ  and
2
slβ  are the weight factors in Eq. (17) 
associated with the numerical difference between security levels of y and i and the security 
relevance factor ( , )
sl
i xθ , respectively. 1η  and 2η  are the weight factors in Eq. (19) used to 
determine how much the direct reputation and integrated reputation affect the final reputation, 
respectively. a and b are the weight factors in Eq. (8) to determine the value of the profit 
function that gives the profits gained by a user when it provides the recommendation. Each 
data point depicted in the following figures is the average of the results obtained from 100 
runs of simulation experiments with a simulation time of 100 s each. 
We adopt the MCC-based query system for electronic medical records as the simulation 
scenario. In the scenario, a mobile client requesting electronic medical records first connects 
to a BTS, which accesses the mesh backbone via the mesh router. Then, the MC will send a 
service request to the cloud service provider (CSP) to ask for the electronic medical records. 
When the CSP receives the request, it will evaluate the trustworthiness of the MC and decide 
whether to approve the request. The detailed process is described as follows. 
First, if there are one or more BTSs that the MC can directly access, it will broadcast a 
query message to its neighbor clients to query which BTS is more secure and reliable. If there 
is no BTS that the MC can directly access, it will evaluate the reputation of the neighbor 
clients based on the CCRM and select a most trustworthy client as a relay node to connect to 
the BTS. Second, when the request message is transported in the WMN, the CCRM is used to 
select a trustworthy route in order to prevent the privacy information in the request message 
from being eavesdropped on or tampered. Third, when the CSP receives the request, it will 
evaluate the trustworthiness of the MC using the CCRM and decide whether to approve the 
request. 
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed CCRM is compared to the Harmony 
[22], RP-CRM [14] and ARTSense [23] because the RP-CRM was a similar reputation 
mechanism proposed in our previous work, while Harmony and ARTSense are the latest 
proposed related mechanisms. The following performance metrics are evaluated when internal 
collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks are present. 
  Utility of the recommender: The utility obtained by recommenders when they provide 
recommendations.  
  Reputation and its update accuracy: The reputation of a user and the update accuracy 
of its reputation. 
  Impact of context information: The impact of contextual information on users’ 
reputations. 
  Effective recommendation rate (ERR): The ratio of the number of accurate 
recommendations and the number of all recommendations. 
  Malicious user detection rate (MDR): The accuracy of detecting and identifying 
malicious users. 
5.2.1 Utility of the Recommender 
First, we investigate how the CCRM performs in an honest network and a hostile network, 
respectively. In the honest network, all the recommenders are normal users, while in the 
hostile network, the recommenders may be malicious users who give false information with 
the probability λ.  
 
Fig. 2. Utility of the Recommender: (a) Utility of the honest one (b) Utility of the 
malicious one 
The average utility of the recommender in the honest network is shown in Fig. 2 (a). The 
results show that the more truthful information the recommender provides, the larger average 
utility it achieves. In the CCRM, the VCG-based VDCR scheme will be run before users 
provide their recommendations. According to the characteristics of VCG, a user that 
participates the recommendation and does truth-telling is the best strategy; thus, a normal user 
in the honest work will always provide truthful information, which leads to an increase in its 
utility. Moreover, the utility a user gained in a recommendation will be used to update the 
user’s reputation, which leads to the continuous growth of its utility. 
In Fig. 2 (b), we analyze how the false recommendation from an adversary would impact 
its utility. We set three adversaries with the probability of giving false information (λ) being 1, 
0.2 and 0.5, respectively. It is assumed that all of them have a utility value of 1 at the 
beginning of the test. The results show that the average utility of the malicious user is affected 
by providing dishonest recommendations, and the larger the λ, the faster the utility decreases. 
When an adversary has a λ of 1 (i.e., always reports false information), its utility drops the 
fastest to 0. The utility of an adversary who sometimes sends correct information (with λ= 0.2 
and 0.5) decreases more slowly. The utility eventually drops to a very low level, however, 
even if false information is sent with a small probability (λ= 0.2). This is because when the 
adversary gives a dishonest recommendation, according to the characteristics of the VCG 
mechanism, the proposed VDCR makes it pay a higher cost, which leads to a decline in its 
utility. In our mechanism, when the user’s utility becomes less than 0, it is reset to 0. 
5.2.2 Reputation and Its Update Accuracy 
  Next, we analyze the impact of the adversary	   ratio on users’ reputations and compare the 
reputation and its update accuracy of the CCRM with those of the RP-CRM, ARTSence and 
Harmony. The λ of all adversaries is set to be 1, which represents the worst case scenario. 
 
Fig. 3. Reputation and its update accuracy: (a) Reputation (b) Reputation update 
accuracy 
We first compare the reputation decrease speed of the four mechanisms. The percentage of 
adversaries among all users is set from 0 to 50%. The results are shown in the Fig. 3 (a). It is 
clear that as the ratio of adversaries increases, the reputation in all the four mechanisms drops, 
while the reputation in the CCRM decreases the fastest. Because the adversaries are colluding 
and bad mouthing, the adversaries’ false reports will gain more support from other collusive 
users and they can also provide dishonest recommendations to frame up good parties and/or 
boost the reputation values of malicious peers. However, the VDCR and VCG-RIM schemes 
proposed in the CCRM and RP-CRM, respectively, can incentivize users to tell truth to 
effectively defend against collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks, which makes the 
reputation decrease faster than under the ARTSense and Harmony mechanisms. Moreover, 
with the combination of security level-based data categories and user context information 
sensing, the CCRM implements fine-grained reputation evaluation that makes the reputation 
decrease faster than under the RP-CRM with adversaries in the network. 
We also compare the reputation update accuracy of the four mechanisms. The percentage of 
adversaries is set at 30%. From the results shown in Fig. 3 (b), we can see that the users’ 
reputation increases as time increases (i.e., the number of interactions increases). Similar to 
the speed of reputation decrease, the CCRM has a higher reputation update accuracy than the 
other three mechanisms. Although the RP-CRM also can incentivize users to provide truthful 
information to defend against internal collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks, the absence 
of fine-grained reputation evaluation makes its reputation update accuracy worse than that of 
CCRM. Because both ARTSense and Harmony lack reliable recommendation evaluation 
mechanisms to effectively defend against internal collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks, 
the false recommendations of malicious peers make the accuracy of updates of users’ 
reputations lower than that under the RP-CRM and CCRM. 
5.2.3 Impact of Context Information 
Next, we compare the impact of context sensing on reputation among these four 
mechanisms. The characteristics of the mobile and random access in the MCC-based big data 
applications make contextual information such as time, location, data category, etc., an 
important factor in both the direct and the recommended reputation computation processes. 
Accurate contextual information can help improve the accuracy and reliability of the 
reputation evaluation. In this simulation, we consider two scenarios: (1) an honest network 
environment without attacks, and (2) a hostile network environment with adversaries.  
 Fig. 4. Impact of Contextual Information: (a) Honest network (b) Hostile network 
The results in Fig. 4 (a) show that users' reputations increase as the interaction time 
increases because they always provide honest information in the honest network. In the 
RP-CRM, the evaluation and update of reputations only depend on the historical interaction 
behaviors and ignore the time and location influences, so the reputation of the RP-CRM 
increases most quickly among the four mechanisms. For Harmony, although it introduces the 
data category into the reputation evaluation, time and location influence are ignored, which 
makes its reputation evaluation less accurate than that of CCRM and ARTSense. On the other 
hand, ARTSense considers the time and location influence on reputation, but it does not take 
the data category into account, so its reputation evaluation accuracy is lower than that of the 
CCRM. In Fig. 4 (b), we observe that although the adversaries exist, the value and increase 
speed of reputation of the RP-CRM and Harmony are close to those in Fig. 4 (a). This is 
because they cannot effectively discover and defend against context-based attacks. In contrast, 
owing to the introduction of contextual information into the reputation evaluation, the 
ARTSense and CCRM can overcome the shortcomings of the RP-CRM and Harmony; hence 
their value and increased speed of reputation are less than those in Fig. 4 (a). Meanwhile, the 
comprehensive consideration of the time, location and data category makes the performance 
of the CCRM better than the ARTSense. 
5.2.4 Effective Recommendation Rate 
We also evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of the four reputation mechanisms by 
comparing their ERR performances. 
  
Fig. 5. Effective recommendation rate: (a) in an honest network, (b) in a hostile network 
with 20% adversaries, and (c) in a hostile network with 50% adversaries 
The results in Fig. 5 (a) show that under the honest network environment, the ERRs of the 
four mechanisms are very close. Compared to the results in Fig. 5 (a), in Fig. 5 (b) and (c) 
where the adversaries are present, the ERRs of the ARTSense and Harmony decrease by 15% 
and 30%, respectively, and the ERRs of the RP-CRM and CCRM decrease by 10% and 20%, 
respectively. The comparison results show that the internal attacks have a large impact on the 
effectiveness and reliability of the recommendation, which will further affect the effectiveness 
and reliability of the final reputation evaluation. In Fig. 5 (b) and (c), the adversaries may 
launch the collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks to provide the false recommendation 
information, which makes the ERR performance worse than that in the honest network. 
In addition, Fig. 5 (b) and (c) show that the ERR of the CCRM is higher than the other 
three mechanisms. The reason is that the VDCR in CCRM can effectively incentivize the 
recommenders to tell the truth and thus enhance the reliability of recommendations. Moreover, 
the security relevance factor ensures that only those recommendations with similar security 
levels and related historical data access categories are accepted, which further improves the 
effectiveness of the recommendation. For RP-CRM, although it selects the recommendation 
user and the recommendation based on the security relevance factor, it cannot incentivize 
users to tell the truth, which results in a lower ERR than the CCRM. ARTSense and Harmony 
did not consider improving the effectiveness and reliability of recommendations, so their 
ERRs are worse than those of the CCRM and RP-CRM. 
5.2.5 Malicious User Detection Rate 
Next, we analyze the malicious user detection rate under two hostile network environments 
with 50% and 70% adversaries, respectively. 
 
Fig. 6. Malicious user detection rate: (a) with 50% adversaries and (b) with 70% 
adversaries 
In Fig. 6 (a) and (b), as expected, the MDR decreases with time and the growing percentage 
of adversaries. It is observed that the MDR of the CCRM is highest among the four 
mechanisms. This finding is observed because the integrated combination of the data category, 
context sensing, security relevance and recommendation incentive scheme improves the 
accuracy, efficiency, and reliability of the reputation evaluation and thus enhances the MDR. 
Although the other mechanisms also adopt related technologies to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of the reputation evaluation, they either consider the improvement of the direct 
reputation evaluation or the improvement of the recommended reputation evaluation in 
isolation. Therefore, their MDR is lower than that of the CCRM. 
5.2.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this subsection, we provide a sensitivity analysis of the parameters cα , locationα  and 
timeα that strongly characterize the proposed CCRM.  
In Figs. 7-9, we can see that the user’s reputation first increases and then starts to fluctuate 
as the parameters cα , locationα  and timeα increase. According to Eq. (2), the increase of the 
three parameters leads to the decrease of uncertainty, which improves the direct reputation 
and thus results in the increase of the final reputation when the recommended reputation is 
fixed. Hence the node’s reputation increases when these three parameters increase initially. 
According to Eq. (1), however, the increase of these three parameters may also lead to the 
decline of the direct reputation because 1) with the higher cα , the cardinality of data 
categories set C increases; 2) with the larger locationα , the expected distance between the 
locations of the interacting users become smaller, and hence, the number of unsuccessful data 
access attempts, cfAC , increases; and 3) with the bigger timeα , the expected time interval 
between the user interactions becomes larger, and hence, the number of unsuccessful data 
access attempts, cfAC , increases. Consequently, with the declining direct reputation, the final 
reputation becomes more dependent on and starts to fluctuate in line with the recommended 
reputation.    
 
Fig. 7. Impact of data category access 
factor cα on the reputation 
 
Fig. 8. Impact of location factor 
locationα on the reputation 
 
Fig. 9. Impact of time factor timeα  on the reputation 
5.3 Discussion of the Results 
In this subsection, we discuss the simulation experimental results to offer some insights 
obtained from the proposed approach.  
1) Utility of the recommender  
The results show that the more truthful information the recommender provides, the larger 
average utility it gets. According to the characteristics of VCG, a user that participates in the 
recommendation and does truth-telling is the best strategy; thus, a normal user in the honest 
work will always provide truthful information. The results show that the average utility of the 
malicious user is affected by providing dishonest recommendations. When the adversary 
gives dishonest recommendations, according to the characteristics of the VCG mechanism, 
the proposed VDCR makes it pay more, which leads to a decline in its utility.  
2) Reputation and its update accuracy 
As the ratio of adversaries increases, the reputation drops, while the reputation in the 
CCRM decreases the fastest compared to other mechanisms. The VDCR scheme proposed in 
the CCRM can incentivize users to tell the truth to effectively defend against the collusion 
attacks and bad mouthing attacks, which causes the reputation to decrease rapidly. Moreover, 
with the combination of security level-based data categories and user contextual information 
sensing, the CCRM implements fine-grained reputation evaluation. We can also see that the 
users’ reputations increase as the time increases. Similar to the decreasing speed of reputation, 
the CCRM has a higher reputation update accuracy than the other three mechanisms.  
3) Impact of context information 
Owing to the introduction of contextual information into the reputation evaluation, the 
CCRM can overcome the shortcomings of the RP-CRM and Harmony and can obtain a 
smaller value and increased speed of reputation than the case where no adversary is present. 
Meanwhile, the comprehensive consideration of the time, location and data category makes 
the performance of the CCRM better than that of ARTSense. 
4) Effective recommendation rate (ERR) 
The comparison results show that the internal attacks have a large impact on the 
effectiveness and reliability of the recommendation, which will further affect the effectiveness 
and reliability of the final reputation evaluation. We can also see that the ERR of the CCRM is 
higher than the other three mechanisms. Moreover, the security relevance factor ensures that 
only those recommendations with similar security levels and related historical data access 
categories are accepted, which further improves the effectiveness of the recommendation. 
5) Malicious user detection rate (MDR) 
The MDR decreases with the time and the growing percentage of the adversaries. It is 
observed that the MDR of the CCRM is the highest among all the four mechanisms. This is 
because the integrated combination of the data category, context sensing, security relevance 
evaluation and recommendation incentive scheme improves the accuracy, efficiency, and 
reliability of the reputation evaluation, and thus enhances the MDR.  
6) Parameters sensitivity 
We can see that the user’s reputation first increases and then starts to fluctuate as the 
parameters cα , locationα  and timeα increase. The increase of the three parameters leads to the 
decrease of the uncertainty, which improves the direct reputation and thus results in the 
increase of the final reputation. The further increase of these three parameters, however, may 
also lead to the decline of the direct reputation, which causes the final reputation to become 
more dependent on the recommended reputation and begin to fluctuate in line with the 
recommended reputation.    
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we investigated the problem of protecting against internal attacks for 
enhancing data veracity in Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC). A new category-based context 
aware and recommendation incentive reputation mechanism named CCRM has been proposed, 
which incorporates innovative technologies in terms of data categories, context sensing, 
security relevance and recommendation incentive. The simulation-based experiments and 
performance analysis have verified that the CCRM is effective and efficient. More 
specifically, in the presence of collusion attacks and bad mouthing attacks, the utility of the 
recommender, the decrease speed and update accuracy of reputation, the effective 
recommendation rate, and the malicious user detection rate of the proposed CCRM are better 
than those of the existing RP-CRM, ARTSense and Harmony mechanisms. 
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